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This testimony addresses a number of specific issues relating to the current trade
negotiations between the United States and Japan in the automotive sector, the so-called
"Framework Negotiations." My remarks draw on some recent analyses my colleagues and
I have performed on the competitive situation of the North American automotive industry.
I will limit my remarks to three issue areas. First, the importance and likely future
developments in bilateral automotive trade, particularly in the light of recent competitive
developments. Second, what levels of economic activity in the automotive supplier sector
does vehicle assembly generate and how might it differ between Big Three and Japanese-
affiliated assembly operations in the United States? Third, how might we objectively
measure the U.S. supplier content of vehicles so that we can determine a baseline for
assessing change?
I should say at the outset that I find the basic premise of the automotive Framework
negotiations promising. As I understand it, the first step is to develop reasonable measures
of the current situation, so that both Japan and the United States are addressing the issue
from a common understanding, if not perspective. Such a jointly recognized measure
would, I believe, permit more fruitful and beneficial negotiations as to progress in deficit
reduction, methods of deficit reduction, and a common frame of reference for resolving
outstanding issues. I am somewhat disheartened to note that much of the public debate has
degenerated to disputes about targets, goals, and pledges, and about which country now
adheres more closely to free trade principles.
I must also say that I increasingly find the comparison of the Japanese and U.S.
automotive manufacturers less and less useful. We have reached the point where the
achievements and strategies of the companies are so different within each industry, and the
comparisons of companies across industries so variable, that it is difficult to lump them
together into national industries for some purposes. I think this is especially true of the
Japanese companies in North America, where the sourcing patterns—especially increased
sourcing from traditional U.S. suppliers—are quite different across the companies. I
believe that some of the Japanese companies are quite sincere in their efforts to increase
sourcing from traditional U.S. suppliers, whether to avoid friction or to seek economic
advantage. On the other hand, some still seem resistant, lacking in serious effort to
consider fairly the performance and advantages these suppliers offer.
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The bilateral U.S.-Japan automotive trade deficit
Let me summarize the key points and findings from a study we completed last summer:
1. The automotive trade deficit continues to have major implications for overall
U.S. trade performance: at just over $50 billion, it accounted for about 60 percent
of the total U.S. merchandise deficit in 1992, some 11 percent more than it
accounted for in 1990, although it fell some $9 billion compared to 1990.
2. The composition of the total automotive deficit has altered significantly, with the
parts' share growing from 7 percent in 1985 to 19 percent in 1992, in spite of a
substantial decline from 1989, when part share was 27 percent.
3. In spite of the yen nearly doubling in strengthen from 1985 to 1992, the current
dollar automotive trade deficit with Japan increased 30 percent over that period and
now accounts for about 62 percent of the total automotive deficit. The deficit of
$31.5 billion in 1992 has been essentially stable for three years.
4. The growth in the bilateral deficit since 1985 has been almost entirely due to
trade in parts. The parts share of the bilateral deficit increased from 19 percent to
35 percent, and, at $10.9 billion, offsets an 1992 automotive parts surplus of some
$1.2 billion with the rest of the world. The bilateral parts deficit now reflects
Japanese parts imports to the United States of $11.86 billion, and U.S. parts
exports to Japan of $930 million. Those 1992 U.S. parts exports of $930 million
represent almost a quadrupling since 1985.
5. Our scenario method for projecting the 1996 bilateral vehicle deficit results in
four forecasts, all assuming that Japanese vehicle sales are sourced 55 percent in
North America and 45 percent from Japan. Our 16 million market, stable Japanese
share case calls for unit imports from Japan to rise 7 percent, while the increase in
U.S. vehicle exports to 100,000 units (an increase of some 145 percent) results in a
deficit that rises just over 19 percent, to about $24.38 billion constant 1992 dollars.
Our 15 million market and Japanese share falling 3.4 points case sees Japanese unit
imports down some 12 percent, U.S. exports tripling to 120,000 units, and the
constant dollar deficit falling to $19.2 billion, down just over 6 percent. The value
and units of Japanese vehicle imports do not move in lockstep because the Japanese
industry is exporting more expensive vehicles to the United Slates as they enter
more lucrative segments of the market.
6. Increased transplant production will drive the parts trade deficit, but we still
expect that deficit to fall by 1996, after increasing in 1993 through 1995. In our
strong market, stable Japanese share scenario, parts imports for 1996 will reach
$12 billion 1992 dollars. This is up 1 percent from 1992 levels, although the
market and total Japanese sales in the United States are each 24 percent larger. In
our average market, shrinking Japanese share scenario, parts imports in 1996 will
reach just over $11 billion 1992 dollars, down 6.5 percent from 1992, although the
market is 16 percent larger, and Japanese sales rise 1 percent.
7. Our combined forecast for vehicle and parts bilateral deficits for 1996 yield a
constant dollar deficit ranging from $34.95 billion, up 11 percent from 1992, to
$27.97 billion, down about 11 percent. The parts share of the total deficit accounts
for 30 to 31 percent of the total.
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The news for the traditional domestic industry has indeed been good of late. The
Big Three regained about 2 points of production share in 1993, are enjoying improved
profit performance, appear to have substantially reduced the quality advantages of Japanese
nameplates, and now enjoy a price advantage over comparable Japanese vehicles. The
market continues to shift to light trucks, a segment where Big Three share is over 86
percent, and away from cars, where their share is a more modest 60 percent. For the
nation, there is the added good news of a continued increase in the share of Japanese
nameplate sales that are sourced here in the United States or in Canada, rather than Japan.
However, the return of better times to Detroit in and of itself will not eliminate the
national problem of that troublesome deficit. Our trade projections assume a growing light
truck share, and we developed scenarios that set Japanese share loss at over three points.
In spite of these favorable developments for the Big Three, our scenarios forecast a
continuing, although perhaps slightly easing bilateral trade deficit through 1996. Nor will
increased sourcing of Japanese sales from U.S. operations substantially reduce that deficit
in the next few years.
Moreover, the continuing economic difficulties of Japan and some very real
challenges faced by the Japanese industry make it unlikely that the changed economics of
automotive production, now tilted in favor of the United States, will result in a smooth
transition to a more open Japanese market in parts and vehicles. In particular, the Japanese
manufacturers' understandable preference for supporting their traditional suppliers in Japan
and affiliated operations in the United States will continue to pose immense access
problems for fully competitive traditional U.S. suppliers. We also expect to see a reduction
in the number of new models and an extension of the product life cycle in Japan, thus
slowing any natural increase new models might spur in the sourcing of parts and
components to traditional U.S. suppliers.
Suppliers of Parts and Components
A knotty aspect of the bilateral automotive deficit is the role of the Japanese-
affiliated operations of the Japanese manufacturers and their traditional suppliers, drawn
here in large numbers in the late 1980s to serve their customers. Some see these activities
as an important part of the eventual solution—reduction of the trade imbalance, as they
essentially replace imported automotive goods from Japan. Others see them as an enduring
part of the problem because of their high Japanese import content and low U.S.—
especially traditional U.S.—supplier content. Whatever their eventual role may be, there is
little question that they contribute to the problem today, and will continue to do so for some
years to come.
These operations, by all reports, rely upon substantially lower U.S. part and
component content, and substantially higher Japanese import content than do the Big Three
and traditional U.S. suppliers. However, it is difficult to estimate exactly what these levels
may be, especially since anecdotal evidence suggests that they are changing rapidly, at least
for some of the Japanese manufacturers' affiliated U.S. operations.
This "domestic content" is important because it determines the "multiplier" effect for
the basic operations of vehicle assembly. There is no question in my mind that the U.S.
economic activity generated by the Big Three at traditional suppliers exceeds that generated
by Japanese-affiliated U.S. manufacturers to a substantial degree. Moreover, the sourcing
patterns determine the kind of supplier work performed, and 1 believe it is critical that the
United States maintain a technically sophisticated automotive supplier industry. We arc too
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large an economy, and auto suppliers play too important a role in our economy, to be
simply another industry's source of less expensive labor.
In 1991 we performed a case analysis of Honda's sourcing, basing this work on
publicly available and OSAT collected information. I must stress that we selected Honda,
not to hold them up for particular criticism, but because we felt that Honda probably had
the highest level of domestic sourcing, and their lead in U.S. production might suggest
how other Japanese-affiliated manufacturers would source production parts and
components as they increased volumes and gained U.S. experience. Our analysis
confirmed Honda's high levels of domestic content, but at 62 percent, rather than the near
75 percent often reported in the press at that time. We estimated that some 16 percent of the
total value of the vehicle was sourced from traditional U.S. suppliers, while Japanese-
affiliated suppliers accounted for 26 percent and Honda's own U.S. operations for another
20 percent. The balance, or 38 percent, was imported. If we examine only the sourceable
content—purchased parts and components—20 percent come from traditional U.S. parts
suppliers, 33 percent from transplant suppliers, and 48 percent from offshore sources.
Our statistical analysis associated $3,345 of imported Japanese auto parts with each
vehicle assembled at Japanese-affiliated operations in the United States during 1992. This
represents an increase of more than $300 in parts imports compared with our 1990 result—
a 5 percent increase, compounded annually. If we assume a 3 percent inflation rate over the
last two years and corresponding indexed wages, then there was virtually no change in
transplant import content from 1990 to 1992. Moreover, the average value of Japanese-
affiliated production increased over the same period, as intermediate passenger cars rose
from 43 percent to 64 percent of the production mix. These data, then, suggest that there
probably has been some replacement of imported parts by domestic U.S. parts production.
However, the level of import content is still extremely high, especially since Big Three
production was not reliably related to Japanese parts imports in 1992.
We will soon publish a series of forecasts through the year 2(X)3, based on expert
opinion of members of the U.S. industry, including both traditional and Japanese-affiliated
manufacturers and suppliers. While our respondents are certainly not always correct in
their forecasts, their forecasts do reveal their planning assumptions. These participants
estimate the U.S. sourcing of Japanese-affiliated manufacturers at about 20% currently,
and rising just to 21% by 2003, as most of the increased North American sourcing goes to
Mexico. By contrast, they estimate that the Big Three currently source 60% in the United
States, falling to 44% by 2003, but still more than twice the level of the Japanese-affiliated
assemblers.
We also performed an analysis of the change in composition of U.S.-Japan
automotive parts trade. These results suggested that fast-growing Japanese exports
through 1991 could be characterized as high-value, while fast growing U.S. exports could
be characterized as low value. Similarly, our case study results .suggested that U.S.
suppliers to Honda were underrepresented in high value subsystems like the engine and
transmission, and overrepresented in lower value systems, like hardware and interior trim.
The engineering work required for automotive production is sophisticated and well-
paying, and therefore engineering activity should be considered an important economic-
benefit of an automotive industry. Our forthcoming forecasts series estimates that the Big
Three currently perform 90% of their engineering for North American production in North
America, probably falling to 80% by 2003. Japanese-affiliated manufacturers are estimated
to perform about 10% here currently, rising to 25% by 2003.
Finally, the traditional U.S. supplier still finds it extremely difficult to penetrate the
Japanese original equipment parts market, the largest single-nation parts market in the
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world since 1981. While parts exports from the United States to Japan have grown
rapidly, they still totaled less than $1 billion in 1992. Our surplus with the rest of the
automotive world makes it as difficult to believe that this reflects a free economic market as
it is to believe that less than 1% vehicle share in Japan simply reflects consumer preference.
Measurement of U.S. content
Analysts and companies report a variety of numbers that intuitively appear related to
the bilateral automotive trade deficit Thus, a manufacturer may label the "U.S. content" of
a particular vehicle, based on its material and part (but not assembly) content; or report that
it is a "domestic" vehicle (75 percent U.S. and Canadian content) under Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, which covers most costs. The manufacturers may also
claim tariff-free crossing of the U.S.-Canadian-Mexican borders under NAFTA, with its
specific content tracing requirements, or report the total volume of "auto parts and
materials" purchased for export to Japan. While all of these trade numbers do relate to the
bilateral automotive trade deficit, they do so in different, and often complicated, ways.
Even trade data has its pitfalls, as the U.S. government relies on two different sources, and
the U.S. and Japanese governments use different methods for valuing imports.
It is not surprising that U.S. government numbers typically suggest lower exports
of U.S. automotive parts and components to Japan than do the numbers often cited by
Japanese companies and trade associations to demonstrate their commitment to higher
levels of sourcing in the United States. JAMA and MITI release figures on the purchase of
U.S.-made parts by Japanese automotive firms on a regular basis that are sometimes
referred to as part of the "MOSS Data Collection." Figure 1 displays the published reports
of these purchases on a Japanese fiscal year basis for 1986-1991 and the first half of 1992,
as well as U.S. government totals for the full calendar years 1986-1992.
Figure 1 shows the JAMA/MITI totals of Japanese manufacturer's total purchases
of U.S.-made parts rising from a level of $2.5 billion in FY 1986 to a level of $10.5 billion
in FY 1991, with an encouraging $6.7 billion for the first half of FY 1992. We estimate,
based on these figures, that automotive part and component exports to Japan from the
United States rose from $400 million in FY 1986 to a total of $2.1 billion in 1991, or a five¬
fold gain. However, the U.S. ITC reports that exports of automotive parts to Japan rose
four-fold, but from a lower base of $203 million in 1986 to $835 million in 1991. These
two 1991 estimates are just about $1.25 billion apart, and undoubtedly bear on the different
evaluations the two countries—and industry members—make about the rate and level of
progress in opening the Japanese parts market to U.S. sales.
We think most of the difference in these estimated exports to Japan is due to
different definitions of automotive parts and components. The definitions used by the ITC
to report automotive parts trade target discrete products, generally used in the final
assembly of major automotive components or the vehicle itself. On the other hand, the
JAMA/MITI—and Japanese manufacturer—definition of automotive parts appears to
incorporate purchases of other goods and products by automotive companies. These
include both raw materials (such as aluminum ingots), paint, plastic resins, and other
products (such as textiles for carpeting and leather for seat covers) that have many non-
automotive uses. To be sure, these non automotive purchases and exports are recorded by
the ITC, but in other product categories. Thus, such purchases count as U.S. exports in
determining the overall bilateral trade balance, but they are not counted in the calculation of
the specific automotive trade balance.
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These differences in definition reflect differing concerns and information. From the
view of a Japanese company, it makes perfect sense to record as an automotive purchase
and export those materials and products that they buy for use in automotive production in
Japan. From the view of the U.S. government, it is more efficient and accurate to simply
record the product and categorize it by general use, rather than to make its categorization
dependent on determining its final specific use.
Figure 1
Japanese Purchases of U.S. Automotive Parts
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* 1992 data: ITC figures are for entire year, JAMA figures are for 1st half.
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Source: Japanese Automobile Manufacturing Association, U.S.
International Trade Commision
However, these numbers do suggest a problematic pattern in the development of
U.S. automotive-related exports. First, the ITC's more restrictive definition of automotive
parts suggests that automotive exports to Japan have increased, reaching a level of over
$800 million by 1991. Second, since we assume that the JAMA/MITI numbers typically
include the trade flows reported by the ITC, we can recover an estimate of trade
developments for automotive-related, but non automotive goods. Subtracting the ITC
numbers from the JAMA/MITI numbers suggests that the exports of automotive-related
goods have grown from some $200 million to $1.25 billion, or over 600 percent, from
FY1986 to FY1991. Thus exports of ITC-defined automotive goods fell from 51 percent
of the JAMA/MITI FY 1986 total to 40 percent of the FY 1991 total.
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These non automotive goods are typically both lower value and lower value-added
than automotive goods as defined by the ITC. Moreover, they are often produced by
companies less reliant on their automotive business than those that produce automotive
goods as defined by the ITC. Therefore, the economic and industry implications of
increased exports to Japan are quite different for the ITC and JAMA/MIT1 estimates.
While we think that most of the disagreement between ITC and JAMA/MITI export
estimates is rooted in these differing definitions, we do think it is possible that JAMA/MITI
numbers occasionally double-count purchases. For example, the purchase of steel in the
United States that is used to fabricate a part or stamping in a U.S. facility may be properly
counted as a domestic-use purchase. However, the full value of the exported part or
stamping—including the value of the steel—may also be counted as an export. Such
double-counts are difficult to avoid, and thus would not be especially surprising if they in
fact occur.
JAMA and MITI also report Japanese manufacturers' total purchases of U.S.
automotive parts for use at their facilities in the United States. These purchases reached
$8.45 billion in FY 1991, up four-fold compared with FY 1986 purchases. This estimate
raises an immediate question: why has such an increase in purchases, culminating in such a
high level, seemingly not affected the parts trade deficit? While these purchases are not
exports, one might expect that to some extent they substitute for imported parts.
There are many reasons why these JAMA/MITI domestic-use numbers might be so
at odds with U.S. government reports of the bilateral deficit. First, the production of
Japanese vehicles in the United States more than doubled from 1986 to 1991, increasing
the total U.S. purchases. Second, these probably include purchases that would be treated
as "automotive" in an input/output analysis of the economy, while U.S. trade data include
only discrete automotive parts. If we apply the same percentage figure that we calculated
for exports in 1991, we would expect about $3.4 billion of this total to represent
automotive parts and components as defined for trade purposes and general economic
analysis.
Third, at least some of the Japanese companies include purchases from U.S.
companies that originate outside the United States in their estimates of U.S. purchases.
Thus, if the Japanese manufacturer sources parts from a GM plant for use in Japan, those
are counted as U.S. exports to Japan—even if they come from GM facilities in Canada,
Mexico, Europe, or Asia. This may be an important source of the differences in export
numbers reported by JAMA and the U.S. ITC.
Fourth, in line with CAFE content calculations, U.S. assembly plants typically
count as "U.S." content the full value of parts and components shipped from U.S.-sited
plants, without determining the actual U.S. content of such shipments. Thus an air
conditioner shipped from a component facility in the United States would be treated as 1(X)
percent U.S. content by the automaker, even if most of its value is composed of an
imported Japanese component, such as a compressor. Import content, as measured for
CAFE purposes, is often lower than import content measured in trade terms.
Fifth, there may be some double-counting of purchases for strictly domestic use. If
aluminum is purchased for the production of engine blocks or heads at a Japanese affiliated
engine foundry, its value as a raw material is properly included. But that value may be
counted again if the engine is sold to the assembly plant and also counted, at full value, as a
domestic use purchase. Again, such double-counting would not be surprising.
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Our estimate above assumed that the ratio of automotive parts to total purchases is
the same for export and domestic consumption. However, we suspect that the sourcing of
more restrictively defined automotive goods may in fact be somewhat higher for U.S.
assemblies than for export to Japan. Such sourcing differences would make sense for
bulky, heavy, and low-value parts: they would not be candidates for export from either
country to the other. Can we estimate the proportion of these purchases that are automotive
in the more restrictive sense?
We estimate the^Mpnt dollar capacity or Jwmese-owned, U.S.-sited supplier
facilities at about $4 bMcm, based On estfftmecRmployment of 56,000 in 1991, and
automotive supplier inc®P^ivefage output per worker of over $70,(XX). Of course, these
facilities also sell to the"Big Three, and many are experiencing severe problems of under-
capacity. If we assume that as much as 80 percent of this capacity supplied Japanese-
owned, U.S.-sited facilities, then these facilities might account for about $3.2 billion in
U.S. purchases of automotive parts and components. Perhaps a more realistic estimate of
60 percent of capacity would suggest $2.4 billion in purchases.
We estimated that traditional domestic suppliers accounted for just under $1,600 in
value per unit at Honda. While we recognize that the Japanese manufacturers have
undoubtedly increased their sourcing of automotive parts from traditional U.S. suppliers,
we doubt that this source had reached $1,600 on average by 1991, since Honda produces a
more expensive vehicle. U.S. produced Honda cars are generally thought to have higher
levels of U.S. content than the average of all new entrant assembly plants. However, if the
average level of traditional U.S. supplier content is as high as $1,300 per unit, then 1991 's
Japanese-controlled production in the United States of 1.55 million vehicles would have
yielded just over $2 billion in U.S. content. If traditional supplier content was still as low
as $1,000 per unit, that would yield $1.5 billion in 1991 U.S. content.
The combined low and high estimates for Japanese-affiliated and traditional
suppliers suggest that $4 to $5 billion in U.S. purchases of restrictively defined automotive
parts and components is reasonable, while $8.45 billion is highly unlikely.
We prefer the broader definitions and categories of automotive trade used by
JAMA, especially if combined with a tracing requirement as is the case for NAFTA duly-
free movement. They more closely approximate the approach of input-output analysis for
measuring the relationship, linkages, and importance of an industry to the total economy
than do the discrete part definitions used by the U.S. government. Common, consistent,
and accurate measurement would make these data useful for cost-benefit analyses, and
would facilitate agreement between the two governments on the nature, extent, and perhaps
even seriousness of the trade problems they face.
I would like to close this testimony be repeating a policy recommendation that we
included in our most recent trade analysis, one that supports the purpose and spirit of the
Framework negotiations: The U.S. and Japanese governments should establish a shared
and standardized definition ofautomotive and automotive-related goods and services, and
ensure that automotive trade flows are measured accurately, reliably, and consistently.
It seems to me that this would be a useful and effective first step in bringing about
eventual resolution of bilateral trade friction. Until the two governments use the same
baseline, it is difficult to see how they can move forward in negotiations.
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